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RULE 11 AND RULE REVISION 
Margaret L. Sanner* and Carl Tobias** 
Numerous observers of modem civil practice, whose views 
range across a comparatively broad spectrum, consider the 1983 
amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 the most 
controversial revision since the United States Supreme Court 
promulgated the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.1 
Counsel and litigants overused and abused the 1983 modification to 
Rule 11 by inappropriately stressing the compensatory goal of the 
proviso and improperly deemphasizing the stricture's deterrence 
objective. Many judges vigorously enforced Rule 11, often finding 
violations and imposing burdensome sanctions which frequently 
included large attorney's fees. This activity of lawyers and parties, 
as well as courts' implementation, was responsible for considerable 
unnecessary and expensive litigation that was unrelated to the 
substantive merits of disputes. The overuse, abuse and judicial 
application of the 1983 change had detrimental consequences for 
individuals and groups with relatively little time, money or power, 
such as those who pursue civil rights actions. 
• Partner, Goodman, Allen & Filetti, P.L.L.C., Richmond, Virginia. 
•• Williams Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. I wish to 
thank Sherry Churchill and Pam Smith for processing as well as Russell 
Williams for generous, continuing support. I was a member of the Civil 
Justice Reform Act Advisory Group of the United States District Court for the 
District of Montana and of the Study Committee to Review the Nevada Rules 
of Civil Procedure. However, the views expressed here and errors that remain 
are ours. 
1. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil 
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1930-31 
(1989); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 207 
(1988); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983) (amended 1993) (adding new 
language intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions), 
reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 167 (1983). See generally Carl Tobias, Reconsidering 
Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855 (1992) (reviewing and analyzing the 
controversy surrounding the 1983 amendment, and offering suggestions for the 
future). 
573 
574 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:573 
These complications prompted the federal rule revision entities, 
such as the Judicial Conference of the United States Advisory 
Committee on the Civil Rules (Advisory Committee), to formulate 
and propose significant amendments to the 1983 revision of Federal 
Rule 11. The Supreme Court accepted the recommendation tendered 
by the Judicial Conference, the courts' policymaking arm, and by its 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Standing 
Committee) that the 1983 version be substantially amended and, 
thus, instituted a revision that became effective during 1993. 
Notwithstanding the unusually expeditious attempt to rectify or 
temper the difficulties created by the 1983 modification-a purpose 
which the 1993 alteration has seemingly realized-the experience 
with the 1983 amendment may have undermined confidence in the 
rule revision process of judges, counsel and litigants. 
Two critical examples illustrate this phenomenon. One is the 
increasing willingness of the ninety-four United States District 
Courts to prescribe and apply local practice requirements that depart 
from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Another is the growing 
amenability of the fifty states to promulgate and enforce strictures 
regulating civil practice within their jurisdictions which deviate from 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
All of the propositions recounted above mean that the 1983 
amendment to Rule 11, the version's deployment by attorneys and 
litigants, the revision's effectuation by courts, and its modification 
warrant scrutiny on the twentieth anniversary of the 1983 revision. 
The article undertakes that effort. This article first descriptively 
traces the background of the 1983 amendment to Rule 11. Part I 
emphasizes the difficulties accompanying the revision's invocation 
by lawyers and litigants, as well as judicial implementation, which 
made the proviso the most disputed alteration over the civil rules' 
five-decade history, and which eventually led to its fundamental 
reform. The article then surveys efforts to modify the controversial 
1983 amendment only ten years after the Supreme Court prescribed 
it. The article next attempts to derive lessons from the experience 
with the 1983 version. The article concludes by offering numerous 
recommendations, a majority of which implicate the federal rule 
revision process. 
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I. THE 1983 AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL RULE 11 
The origins and development of the 1983 amendment to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, its employment by counsel and parties, 
and the judicial application of the stricture have received much 
analysis elsewhere.2 Nevertheless, a brief overview will enhance 
understanding of the 1983 modification, why that revision became so 
controversial, and how it was ultimately altered a decade thereafter. 
A. Amendment of the Original Federal Rule 11 
The United States Supreme Court promulgated the 1983 
amendment as a major constituent of an integrated set of revisions. 
The High Court and the amendment entities meant to increase 
attorneys' responsibilities in, and judicial control over, civil 
litigation, especially during the pretrial phase. 3 The 1983 
amendment required lawyers and litigants to conduct reasonable 
prefiling factual and legal inquiries, while certifying that their papers 
were factually well grounded and legally warranted. The 1983 
revision to Rule 11 also mandated that judges levy sanctions on 
counsel and parties who did not discharge these responsibilities. 4 
B. The 1983Amendment's1nvocation and Implementation 
Throughout the initial half-decade after the Supreme Court 
prescribed the 1983 amendment, judges differed on many questions 
which were central to the revision's effectuation. They 
2. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 
86 Nw. U. L. REV. 943, 946-49 (1992); Tobias, supra note 1, at 855, 858-64; 
Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 
FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 478-92 (1991). The initial 1938 rule, which fell into 
disuse because attorneys rarely invoked it and judges were reluctant to impose 
sanctions, had not been amended before 1983. See generally D. Michael 
Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems 
With Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1976) 
(canvassing Rule 11 's history before 1975). 
3. See, e.g., ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE 
MANAGEMENT AND LA WYER RESPONSIBILITY (1984); Carl Tobias, Public Law 
Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 
291-92 (1989). 
4. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1983) (amended 1993), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. at 
167-68. 
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inconsistently interpreted and applied the nascent version. 5 Rule 
11 's 1983 amendment promoted much costly, unwarranted satellite 
litigation which implicated its phrasing as well as the type and 
magnitude of sanctions.6 During this five-year period, Rule 11 
motions were filed and sanctions were imposed against civil rights 
plaintiffs more frequently than any other classification of civil 
litigants. 7 Many courts vigorously applied the revision or levied 
substantial sanctions against parties that did not comply with Rule 
11. 8 Numerous civil rights plaintiffs and their attorneys possess 
comparatively few resources, making them risk averse. Certain 
judges, lawyers, and legal scholars asserted that judicial 
implementation of the 1983 version had chilling effects on these 
litigants and attomeys.9 
5. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 1, at 1930; Vairo, supra note 1, at 207. 
See generally Tobias, supra note 1 (reviewing and analyzing the controversy 
surrounding the 1983 amendment, and offering suggestions for the future). 
6. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121 (2d 
Cir. 1987) (involving satellite litigation over the sanction imposed), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987); see also Burbank, supra note 1, at 1930--31; Carl 
Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigatipn, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 514 (1988-
89). Compare Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(holding that no continuing duty exists to comply with Rule 11 on individual 
papers after the initial filing}, with Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1386-
87 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (finding the existence of a continuing duty), a.ff'd sub 
nom., Blue v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525, 544-46 (4th Cir. 
1990), cert. denied sub nom., Chambers v. United States Dep't of Army, 499 
U.S. 959 (1991). 
7. See, e.g., Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 
I I-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and 
Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1327, 1340 (1986); Vairo, supra note 1, at 
200--01. 
8. See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (providing an illustration of vigorous judicial enforcement); 
Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(providing another example of vigorous judicial enforcement); Avirgan v. 
Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (imposing a $1,000,000 sanction on a 
plaintiff), aff'd, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991). 
9. See Nelken, supra note 7, at 1327, 1340; Tobias, supra note 6, at 495-
98, 503-06; Vairo, supra note 1, at 200-01; cf Advisory Comm. on the Civil 
Rules, Judicial Conference of the U.S., Call for Written Comments on Rule 11 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Related Rules, as Amended in 
1983, 131 F.R.D. 344, 347 (1990) [hereinafter Call for Comments] (finding 
considerable disagreement over whether the 1983 amendment in Federal Rule 
11 had actually chilled the enthusiasm of civil rights plaintiffs). 
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Considerable difficulty in applying Rule 11 resulted from 
courts' uncertainty about the principal objective of the 1983 
amendment. The Advisory Committee Note accompanying the 1983 
revision suggested that its major purpose was to deter litigation 
abuse. 10 Nonetheless, a 1985 study of the amendment's early 
implementation undertaken by the research arm for the federal 
courts, known as the Federal Judicial Center ("FJC"), indicated that 
the revision's goals were to punish offenders, to compensate those 
injured by Rule 11 violations, and to deter future litigation abuse. 11 
When judges who effectuated the alteration did not focus on 
deterrence and made attorney's fees the sanction of choice,12 this 
application granted lawyers and parties economic incentives to file 
Rule 11 motions and prompted them to consider the revision a fee-
shifting device. 13 
These phenomena concomitantly triggered a dramatic increase 
in Rule 11 activity, encouraging the rise and growth of a new form of 
civil litigation. Federal appellate and district court judges published 
approximately 700 Rule 11 decisions in the first three and one-half 
years after the 1983 amendment14 and issued hundreds of additional 
unpublished opinions.15 Indeed, the federal courts published over 
3000 reported Rule 11 determinations by the conclusion of 1990.16 
Much of the early commentary that implicated the revised 
version was comparatively favorable. For instance, Professor Arthur 
R. Miller, who was the Advisory Committee reporter, wrote a 
10. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment, 
reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983). 
11. See SAUL M. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 
(1985); see also 28 U.S.C. § 620 (1994) (authorizing the Federal Judicial 
Center as the research arm of the federal courts and prescribing the entity's 
duties). 
12. See ELIZABETH WIGGINS ET AL., RULE 11: FINAL REPORT TO THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES § lB, at 9 (1991) [hereinafter FJC REPORT]; Nelken, supra 
note 7, at 1333. 
13. See Vairo, supra note 2, at 479-80. But cf Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx 
Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 409 (1990) (stating that "Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting 
statute .... "). 
14. See Vairo, supra note 1, at 199. 
15. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 485-86; Tobias, supra note 3, at 301. 
16. See Vairo, supra note 2, at 480 (citing NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS'N. 
COMMENTS ON RULE 11 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4 (Nov. 
1990)). 
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Federal Judicial Center report that generally praised the 1983 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 
11. 17 Judge William W Schwarzer of the Northern· District of 
California also penned a 1984 article which lauded the Rule 11 
modification and requested that federal courts enforce it rigorously. 18 
Indeed, numerous appellate and district court judges employed 
and cited this work when authoring Rule 11 opinions in the half-
decade after the 1983 revision. 19 However, a few observers did 
criticize the modification. For example, Professor Stephen Burbank 
questioned whether the Supreme Court possessed the requisite 
authority to implement the 1983 amendment, 20 while Professor 
Edward Cavanagh wondered how the revision would function in 
practice.21 
The problems with the 1983 amendment did not become clear 
immediately, and judges and academicians only began suggesting 
ways to treat the problems after several years of experience with the 
proviso. Professor Melissa Nelken published an influential 1986 
paper asserting that judges significantly and incorrectly 
overemphasized the 1983 revision's compensatory goal and notion of 
attorney-fee shifting as an appropriate sanction. Nelken believed that 
the new version was disadvantageous and chilled civil rights 
plaintiffs' enthusiasm for litigation. 22 
Professor Georgene Vairo wrote an important 1988 article in 
which she tendered claims analogous to Nelken's.23 That same year, 
Judge Schwarzer also voiced concerns about satellite litigation and 
17. See MILLER, supra note 3. 
18. William W Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A 
Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985); see also infra note 24 and accompanying 
text. 
19. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 
125 (2d Cir. 1987) (Pratt, J., dissenting); Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 
F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1986); Knop v. Johnson, 667 F. Supp. 512, 519 (W.D. 
Mich. 1987); Holley v. Guiffrida, 112 F.R.D. 172, 174 (D.D.C. 1986). 
20. See Stephen B. Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 997 (1983). 
21. See Edward D. Cavanaugh, Developing Standards Under Amended 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 499 
(1986). 
22. See Nelken, supra note 7. 
23. See Vairo, supra note 1. 
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the amendment's use for purposes of reimbursement.24 During late 
1988, the Federal Judicial Center finished a Rule 11 study which 
accepted some of these ideas, such as the enormous reliance on the 
provision, and rejected others, such as the assertion that the revision 
discouraged civil rights plaintiffs from vigorously pursuing their 
actions.25 In 1989, the Third Circuit Task Force on Rule 11 
published a report observing that courts were inconsistently applying 
the stricture, that Rule 11 was fostering litigation unrelated to 
disputes' merits, and that judicial enforcement could detrimentally 
affect resource-poor litigants. 26 
Ironically, near the time when criticism of the proviso's 
implementation first developed and was growing, federal appeals and 
district courts improved how they effectuated the 1983 amendment. 
For instance, numerous judges began interpreting and applying Rule 
11 in a more uniform way, while the amount of satellite litigation 
generated by the revision declined.27 
Notwithstanding this apparently improved effectuation realized 
by the federal appellate and district courts, the Advisory Committee 
began considering the prospect of altering Rule 11's1983 version six 
years after its promulgation.28 The next section of this article 
24. See William W Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013 
(1988); see also Tobias, supra note 6 (responding to Judge Schwarzer's 
article); Schwarzer, supra note 18 (affording Judge Schwarzer's earlier Rule 
11 article). 
25. See THOMAS E. WILLGING, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., THE RULE 11 
SANCTIONING PROCESS 67-81, 157-68 (1988); see also KASSIN, supra note 11 
(affording earlier FJC study); WIGGINS ET AL., supra note 12 (affording later 
FJC study). 
26. See STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF 
THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, 
at 13-24, 60-61, 68-72 (1989); see also Burbank, supra note 1. 
27. See Carl Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 VILL. 
L. REV. 105, 110-22 (1991); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Sanctions, 
Symmetry, and Safe Harbors: Limiting Misapplication of Rule 11 By 
Harmonizing It With Pre-Verdict Dismissal Devices, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 
257, 266-67 (1991) (finding decrease in satellite litigation). 
28. See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal 
Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 854 (1991). 
The Advisory Committee is a twelve-member entity comprising judges, law 
professors, and attorneys, which Congress has authorized to study the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and to fonnulate proposals for change as warranted. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1994); see also Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Excessive 
History of Federal Rule 15(c) and Its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 
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canvasses the measure's amendment and emphasizes those sources 
which evince the rule revisers' intent. 
II. THE 1993 RULE AMENDMENT PROCESS 
Many developments, especially numerous propositions traced in 
the article's first segment, apparently coalesced during 1989 and may 
have persuaded the Advisory Committee to evaluate a possible 
amendment to the 1983 Rule 11 modification. Federal District Court 
Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr.29 stated that "[t]he Committee had 
received various requests, formal and informal, for further 
amendment or abrogation of [the 1983 version] of Rule 11" and "was 
aware of several studies of the rule undertaken by various 
individuals, bar associations, and courts," but the members were not 
certain whether the group should propose alterations and, if so, what 
their exact nature should be. 30 
In 1989, the Advisory Committee decided to consider revisions 
to the 1983 version. It resolved to commission another Federal 
Judicial Center Rule 11 evaluation.31 District Judge John Grady, 
who was then serving as Advisory Committee Chair, appointed three 
people to plan this empirical assessment. 32 
During 1991, the FJC finished its compilation and preliminary 
review of data implicating Federal Rule 11 premised on 
computerized docket information that the Federal Judicial Center had 
MICH. L. REV. 1507, 1509-11 (1987)(reviewing congressional involvement in 
the federal civil rulemaking process); Mullenix, supra, at 797 n.2 (describing 
the composition of the Advisory Committee and providing citations to other 
useful authority); Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil 
Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 464-69 (1993) (reviewing the 
history and powers of the Advisory Committee). 
29. Pointer, who was the Advisory Committee's chair from early 1991 until 
mid-1993, served as chair over almost the whole period when the 1993 
revision of Rule 11 transpired. 
30. See SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Attachment B to Letter to Hon. Robert E. 
Keeton, chairman, Standing Committee, from Hon. Sam C. Pointer, Jr., 
chairman, Advisory Committee 2-5 (May 1, 1992)), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 
519, 522-25 (1993) [hereinafter 1992POINTERLETTER]. 
31. See Mullenix, supra note 28, at 854; Tobias, supra note 1, at 861-62. 
32. District Judge John Grady appointed the following three people: 
Professor Paul Carrington, the Advisory Committee reporter; Magistrate Judge 
Wayne Brazil of the Northern District of California; and Thomas Willging, 
Deputy Research Director of the Federal Judicial Center. 
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gathered from five representative federal district courts and 
responses to questionnaires which the Judicial Center had circulated 
to all federal district judges. JJ The data gleaned from the five courts 
indicated that, on average, judges were no more likely to find civil 
rights plaintiffs in violation than litigants who filed other types of 
cases that prompted substantial Rule 11 activity.J4 However, courts 
did impose attorney's fees as the sanction of choice.JS Two principal 
themes emerged from the judicial survey responses. Eighty percent 
of respondents believed that Rule 11 had a positive impact on civil 
litigation, that the advantages derived warranted the time spent on 
judicial implementation, and that the 1983 alteration should be 
retained. J6 
A similar number of judges thought that baseless lawsuits were a 
minor concern and that expeditious rulings on motions to dismiss and 
for summary judgment, pretrial conferences conducted under Federal 
Rule 16, and informal warnings were more effective.J7 Half of those 
jurists who responded believed that "Rule 11 exacerbate[ d] 
contentious behavior between counsel. ,,Js 
In the summer of 1990, the mounting criticism that judges, 
attorneys, parties and scholars leveled at Rule 11 's 1983 alteration 
seemingly persuaded the Advisory Committee to announce publicly 
that it was reconsidering Rule l l.J9 The Committee issued a Call for 
Comments which asked for written responses to ten questions about 
how the proviso was actually operating.40 These included whether 
33. See ELIZABETH WIGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., RULE 11: 
JUDGES SURVEY AND FIELD STUDY PRELIMINARY REPORTS (1991). Because 
the FJC made no changes relevant to this article in compiling its final report, 
cited supra at note 12, I rely on the preliminary report in this part. See Tobias, 
supra note 1, at 864. 
34. See FJC REPORT, supra note 12, § lC, at 1-8. 
35. See id. § IB, at 9. 
36. See id. § lA, at 1. 
37. See id. § lA, at 1-2. 
38. Id. § lA, at 2. These are the survey results most relevant to the issues 
treated in this Article, although the FJC Report includes much additional 
information. 
39. See CALL FOR COMMENTS, supra note 9, at 344; see also Mullenix, 
supra note 28, at 854; Vairo, supra note 2, at 492-93. 
40. CALL FOR COMMENTS, supra note 9, at 345. The controversial nature 
of the proposal to amend the 1983 revision of Rule 11 prompted the Advisory 
Committee to invert the ordinary sequence of soliciting public comment after 
developing a proposal. 
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the 1983 amendment had encouraged counsel to "stop and think'.41 
before they filed papers, whether the benefits of that conduct 
outweighed the expenses in terms of satellite litigation, and whether 
Rule 11 had "been administered unfairly to any particular group of 
lawyers or parties. '.42 
Some 125 individuals and groups responded, and a significant 
percentage of them criticized the 1983 modification as well as its 
invocation by attorneys and clients and judicial effectuation. 43 The 
principal assertions were that the version fostered excessive and 
costly litigation unrelated to the merits, that judges inconsistently 
applied Rule 11, that the measure's implementation detrimentally 
and disproportionately affected civil rights plaintiffs and their 
counsel, and that the Rule promoted incivility among lawyers. 44 
The Committee also invited sixteen experts to give their 
viewpoints at a February 1991 public hearing. These witnesses' 
testimony resembled the responses to the Call for Comments. For 
instance, they spoke about the expensive satellite litigation which 
Rule 11 frequently generated and the measure's deleterious impact 
on civil rights plaintiffs.45 
After the public hearing, the Advisory Committee informally 
agreed to revise the 1983 proviso and acknowledged that the 
widespread criticism of the amendment had merit even though it was 
frequently exaggerated or premised on flawed assumptions. 46 The 
Advisory Committee also thought the 1983 version's goal-to 
demand that litigants stop and think before filing papers-remained 
appropriate and should be maintained, while the evolving precedent 
41. See id at 346-47. 
42. See id 
43. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 862-63; Vairo, supra note 2, at 492-93. 
The public responses are on file at the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts in Washington, D.C. 
44. See id 
45. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 863; Vairo, supra note 2, at 492-93. 
46. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial 
Conference of the U.S., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence 
(Attaclunent to Letter to Hon. Robert E. Keeton, chairman, Standing 
Committee, from Hon. Sam C. Pointer, Jr., chairman, Advisory Committee 
(June 13, i991), reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 63, 64 (1991) (hereinafter 1991 
POINTER LEITER]; 1992 POINTER LEITER, supra note 30. 
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had resolved many difficulties which Rule 11 had created earlier.47 
However, the Committee did find substantiation for five integral 
propositions: 
(1) Rule 11, in conjunction with other rules, has tended to 
impact plaintiffs more frequently and severely than 
defendants; 
(2) it occasionally has created problems for a party which 
seeks to assert novel legal contentions or which needs 
discovery from other persons to determine if the party's 
belief about the facts can be supported with evidence; 
(3) it has too rarely been enforced through nonmonetary 
sanctions, with cost-shifting having become the normative 
sanction; 
( 4) it provides little incentive, and perhaps a disincentive, 
for a party to abandon positions after determining they are 
no longer supportable in fact or law; and 
(5) it sometimes has produced unfortunate conflicts 
between attorney and client, and exacerbated contentious 
behavior between counsel.48 
Once the Advisory Committee reached these determinations and 
informally concluded that Rule 11 should again be revised, Judge 
Pointer and Professor Carrington assumed substantial responsibility 
to develop and craft the proposed modifications for the Advisory 
Committee's consideration at its May 1991 meeting.49 They drafted 
a proposal meant to enhance the Rule's fairness and effectiveness in 
deterring counsel and litigants from proffering and maintaining 
frivolous positions while simultaneously limiting the stricture's use. 
The preliminary draft revision of Rule 11 that the Advisory 
Committee assembled at its Malo 1991 meeting deserves somewhat 
limited treatment in this article. 0 Moreover, various entities in the 
47. See 1991 POINTER LEITER, supra note 46, at 64-65; see also 1992 
POINTER LEITER, supra note 30, at 523 ("In addition, although the great 
majority of Rule 11 motions have not been granted, the time spent by litigants 
and the courts in dealing with such motions has not been insignificant.") 
48. See id. 
49. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 863-64. 
50. The developments which occurred in the day-long session throughout 
which the Committee reviewed Rule 11 's change and the docwnent that 
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rule revision hierarchy later changed certain significant aspects of the 
preliminary draft. However, this article evaluates the important 
features, particularly the alterations that have greatest relevance to 
the 1993 amendment, showing their final resolution, when indicated. 
One central modification prescribed by the Advisory Committee 
implicated representations tendered to the court by lawyers or 
parties. The Advisory Committee imposed a continuing duty on both 
represented and unrepresented litigants to withdraw allegations that 
subsequent research or pretrial discovery showed were 
unsupported. 51 
The Advisory Committee described as ''well-taken" criticism 
that this proposal "might lead to disruptive and wasteful activities 
based on a mere failure to re-read and amend previously filed 
[papers]. "52 The Committee responded by making "several 
modifications to the published language of the text," which 
essentially imposed the duty only on anyone ''who 'pursues' a 
previously filed paper."53 
A significant change in the 1993 amendment of Rule 11 related 
to the legal certification's sufficiency. That change required counsel 
and unrepresented litigants to offer papers warranted by a 
nonfrivolous (rather than a good faith) "argument for the extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new 
law."54 One important difficulty with this alteration was that the 
"good faith" phraseology had acquired certain meaning among 
judges, attorneys and parties. Lawyers and litigants could thus easily 
satisfy the "good faith" standard, while judges enforced the stricture 
felicitously. 55 
members fashioned have received assessment elsewhere. See Tobias, supra 
note 1, at 865-93; Vairo, supra note 2, at 495-500. 
51. See COMMIITEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 
F.R.D. 53, 75 (proposed August 1991) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT]. 
52. 1992 POINTER LETTER, supra note 30, at 523. 
53. See id. 
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (b)(2), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 420-21. The 1993 
amendment, like the 1983 version, initially mandates that papers be warranted 
by existing law. See id.; FED R. CIV. P. 11 (amended 1983), reprinted in 97 
F.R.D. at 167-68 (1983). 
55. Several Advisory Committee members voiced these concerns during the 
1991 meeting. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 871 n.90. 
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The amended Rule 11 correspondingly requires attorneys who 
represent plaintiffs as well as pro se plaintiffs to certify that any 
"allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support 
or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support 
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or 
discovery."56 Defendants' lawyers and pro se defendants must 
similarly certify that all "denials of factual contentions are warranted 
on the evidence, or if specifically so identified, are reasonably based 
on a lack of information or belief."57 
When changing the proviso in the 1983 amendment, the rule 
revision entities required signers to certify that papers were "well 
grounded in fact," and expressly admitted that litigants might have 
plausible reasons to think such facts were true or false, yet needed 
discovery to assemble and confirm evidentiary support.58 The 
Advisory Committee Note observed that the modifications were a 
specific attempt to equalize the burden of the rule uRon plaintiffs and 
defendants as well as to impose a "duty of candor." 9 
The 1993 revision in Rule 11 also significantly changed the 
1983 amendment's mandate that judges levy an appropriate sanction 
to include monetary assessments, namely attorney's fees, when they 
find Rule 11 violations.60 Perhaps the most important change was 
leaving the decision of whether to sanction within the trial court's 
discretion, as it had been before the 1983 revision. 
The 1993 revision also included numerous particular sanctioning 
procedures, in contrast to the 1983 modification, which offered 
virtually no specific guidance.61 Some of the most significant 
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (b)(3), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421 (1993). 
57. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (b)(4), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421 (1993). 
58. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to the 1983 
amendment, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. at 167-68 (1983); FED. R. CIV. P. 11 
advisory committee's note to the 1993 amendment, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 
583, 585 (1993). 
59. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to the 1993 
amendment, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583, 586 (1993); see also PRELIMINARY 
DRAFT, supra note 51, at 76 (examples of subsections that attempt to equalize 
the amendment's burdens). 
60. I rely in this paragraph on FED. R. C1v. P. 11 (amended 1983), reprinted 
in 97 F.R.D. at 167-68; FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (amended 1993), reprinted in 146 
F.R.D. at 421-23. 
61. For additional explanation of these procedures, see Carl Tobias, The 
1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171, 206-09 (1994). 
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requirements inserted in the 1993 alteration mandated that: parties 
file Rule 11 motions independent of other papers; litigants receive 
notice and an opportunity to respond; judges explicate their 
sanctioning decisions; "safe harbors" be provided; and courts 
exercise their discretion to sanction. 62 
A final substantial change to the 1983 amendments related to 
the sanctions that judges levied when they found that counsel or 
parties had violated Rule 11. 63 The amendment seemed to have four 
critical objectives which involved sanctioning: to emphasize that 
courts might assess non-financial sanctions; to deter litigation abuse; 
to discourage reliance on monetary awards, in particular attorney's 
fees; and to reduce judicial enforcement of Rule 11 for compensatory 
objectives.64 
After Judge Pointer and Professor Carrington reduced the 
propositions agreed upon by the Advisory Committee in the May 
1991 session to writing, they circulated the document to the entity's 
members for approval and transmitted a final version to the Standing 
Committee the following month.65 The Standing Committee assessed 
the draft and incorporated minor changes in the proposal during J\lly 
1991. 66 The Standing Committee then issued the suggested revision, 
solicited public comment and held two public hearings.67 
Once the Advisory Committee examined every written comment 
proffered and each oral submission tendered, the group substantially 
changed the draft in April 1992 and submitted that new proposal to 
the Standing Committee.68 In June of that same year, the Standing 
Committee inserted numerous alterations. One major change left 
62. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note to the 1993 
amendment, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583. 
63. I rely in this paragraph on Tobias, supra note 1, at 880-90. 
64. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to the 1993 
amendment, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583. 
65. See 1991 Pointer Letter, supra note 46, at 1, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 63, 
63 (1991); see also Tobias, supra note 1, at 898 (discussing the procedures for 
the amendment to become effective). 
66. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 51, at 74--82; see also Tobias, 
supra note l, at 898 (observing that the standing committee made some 
modifications in July). 
67. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 51, at 53, 56. 
68. See 1992 POINTER LETTER, supra note 30, at 1; see also Randall 
Sambom, Key Panel Votes Shift in Rule 11, NAT'L L. J., July 6, 1992, at 13. 
Winter 2004] RULE 11 AND RULE REVISION 587 
sanction decisionmaking to the courts' discretion.69 In September 
1992, the Judicial Conference endorsed this recommendation without 
further alterations and forwarded it to the Supreme Court. 70 
The Supreme Court evaluated the proposed revision to Rule 11 
as one important constituent in an ambitious set of rule amendments 
proffered by the Standing Committee during autumn 1992. The 
Justices transmitted the suggested Rule 11 alterations unchanged to 
Congress on April 22, 1993.71 Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by 
Justice Clarence Thomas, authored a vociferous dissent to the High 
Court's submission of the Rule 11 revision.72 Justice Scalia thought 
that the proposed amendment would "eliminate a significant and 
necessary deterrent to frivolous litigation," because it granted courts 
discretion in sanctions determinations, disfavored compensatory 
assessments, and prescribed a safe harbor.73 
Although senators and representatives frequently deferred to the 
other entities in the rule revision hierarchy, Congress had exhibited 
substantially greater willingness since 1980 to intercept proposed 
federal rule amendments that covered evidence as well as criminal, 
civil, and appellate procedures. 74 Some House members opposed the 
69. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO 
FEDERAL RULE OF CML PROCEDURE 11, at 46 (July 1992) [hereinafter 
PROPOSED AMENDMENT]; Samborn, supra note 68, at 13 (discussing the 
change which left sanctions decisionmaking to the courts' discretion). 
70. See Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of 
Rule 11, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1775, 1778 (1992). The Supreme Court was 
required to approve and transmit the amendment to Congress before May 1, 
1993, for the revision to take effect in 1993. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2074 
(2001) (establishing time parameters for approval by the Supreme Court); 
Judicial Conference of the U.S., Amendment of Procedures for the Conduct of 
Business by the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, 134 F.R.D. 315, 317 (1991) (explaining the time parameters and 
process for submitting changes to the rules). 
71. See SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FORMS, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 403 
(1993) [hereinafter 1993 AMENDMENTS]. 
72. See id. at 507-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
73. Id. at 507-08; see also supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
74. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1015, 1018-20 (1982); see also Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 
1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 933, 961 
(1991) (discussing Congress's deference to other authorities for rule revision); 
Tobias, supra note 3, at 293, 337--40 (discussing willingness of Congress to 
remain involved with rulemaking). See generally Jack H. Friedenthal, The 
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1993 Rule 11 amendment tendered by the Supreme Court. However, 
the alteration took effect on December 1, 1993 because Congress 
passed no amendatory legislation. 75 
III. LESSONS 
Numerous significant lessons, mainly implicating the federal 
rule revision process, can be gleaned from the experiences detailed in 
the previous sections of this article. One important lesson learned 
from the 1983 amendment is that premising modification on 
anecdotal information, rather than empirical data systematically 
gathered, analyzed and synthesized by experts, can have unintended 
and often detrimental consequences for judges, lawyers and parties 
as well as the rule revision process.7 For example, the 1983 
amendment was an integral feature of a package the High Court 
meant to enlarge attorneys' duties and judicial control by requiring 
sanctions imposition for rule violations (namely deficient prefiling 
inquiries). 77 
Moreover, the rule revisers apparently did not learn from this 
experience because they grounded the 1993 change in Rule 26 on 
limited empirical data. Rule 26 imposed mandatory pre-discovery or 
automatic disclosure. This disclosure requirement provoked even 
greater controversy than the 1983 amendment of Federal Rule 11.78 
Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. 
REV. 673, 673-77 (1975) (discussing judicial power and roles in rule reform). 
75. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. For information that 
documents the various congressional machinations, see H.R. 2814, 103d Cong. 
(1993); Tobias, supra note 61, at 188; New Discovery Rules Take Effect, 
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 6, 1993, at 3, 40. 
76. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 1, at 1927-28; Mullenix, supra note 28, 
at 813-20. See generally A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study 
in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1991); Laurens Walker, 
Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field Experiments, 
51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67. 
77. Virtually no empirical data showed that meritless cases were a grave 
problem or that sanctioning was the best way to address frivolous litigation. 
See Burbank, supra note 1, at 1927-28; supra notes 3--4 and accompanying 
text. 
78. Indeed, Justice Scalia found it "most imprudent to embrace such a 
radical alteration that has not ... been subjected to any significant testing on a 
local level." See 1993 AMENDMENTS, supra note 71, at 511 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). Accord Mullenix, supra note 28, at 813-20; Carl Tobias, In 
Defense of Experimentation with Automatic Disclosure, 27 GA. L. REV. 665, 
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Perhaps the most valuable lesson that implicates the questions 
treated here is that overly frequent revision in substantial numbers of 
rules complicates practice and undermines respect for the 
amendment process. For instance, when the revisers make 
numerous, frequent alterations to strictures, judges may have 
c,lifficulty interpreting and applying them, while lawyers and parties 
must spend time and money finding, understanding and satisfying 
these changes. 
The disadvantages imposed by rule modification's quickened 
pace and the numerous amendments witnessed in the 1983 and 1993 
revisions were exacerbated by a pair of interrelated actions. During 
1990, Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act (the "CJRA"). 
The statute requested that all ninety-four districts experiment with 
local cost and delay reduction techniques.79 Three years later, the 
Supreme Court authorized those districts to eschew or change 
important 1993 federal rules amendments in deference to this 
testing.80 
The problems fostered by the speed and quantity of revisions at 
the national and district court levels actually encouraged scholars to 
urge a moratorium on federal civil rule amendment. 81 Despite their 
importuning, the rule revisers modified the discovery provisos seven 
years after the 1993 amendments. 82 That modification was the fourth 
667 (1993); see also Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in 
Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1 (1992) (analyzing the 
proposed revision imposing automatic disclosure). 
79. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-78 (1994). For analysis of the CJRA, see Lauren 
Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. 
L. REV. 1447 (1994); Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and I990 Judicial 
Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1589 (1994). 
80. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (a) (amended 1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 
431, 437; see also Donna Stienstra, Implementation of Disclosure in United 
States District Courts with Specific Attention To Courts' Responses to Selected 
Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 182 F.R.D. 304 (1998) 
(affording empirical data related to the federal district courts that rejected or 
modified the federal discovery amendments). 
81. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: 
A Cal/for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841 (1993); John B. Oakley, An 
Open Letter on Reforming the Process of Revising the Federal Rules, 55 
MONT. L. REV. 435 (1994). 
82. See, e.g., John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal 
Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 513-20 (2000); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving 
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revision in two decades, causing some observers to question the need 
for and wisdom of the 2000 changes. 83 In short, the rule amendment 
entities not only ignored the admonitions directed at the rate and 
number of modifications, but also compounded the situation by 
prescribing more revisions with even greater alacrity. These 
developments, alone and synergistically, may have discredited the 
federal amendment process. They have at least eroded confidence in 
the federal amendment process, although those notions resist 
definitive proof. 84 
Two phenomena strongly indicate that participants in modem civil 
practice and rule revision believe that the national process has 
undergone a loss of stature, if not credibility. One is the tendency 
among the ninety-four federal districts to promulgate and enforce 
measures governing local practice that conflict with or reiterate the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.85 This development received 
substantial impetus from the CJRA, encouraging the courts to 
prescribe and apply disuniform local strictures, and 1993 federal rule 
amendments which specifically empowered districts to reject or 
modify applicable federal discovery rules. 86 Despite commands in 
the 1985 and 1995 revisions of Federal Rule 83 and in the 1988 
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act (requesting that the 
district courts scrutinize and eliminate or alter conflicting or 
the "Haves" a Little More: Considering the 1998 Discovery Proposals, 52 
SMU L. REV. 229, 233-36 (1999). 
83. See id 
84. For example, it is difficult to identify cause-effect linkages and to 
isolate all relevant variables, such as local legal culture, a phenomenon which 
itself may partly explain the developments. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, A 
New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929, 
944-49 (1996); Robel, supra note 79, at 1484. Several observers have 
expressly proffered the contentions asserted in the text. See, e.g., Mullenix, 
supra note 28, at 855-57; sources cited supra note 81. 
85. See, e.g., Walter W. Heiser, A Critical Review of the Local Rules of the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of California, 33 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 555, 557-64 (1996); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local 
Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural 
Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2011-26 (1989); Carl Tobias, Local 
Federal Civil Procedure for the Twenty-First Century, 77 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 533 (2002). 
86. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
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duplicative local provisos), 87 numerous tribunals have not 
implemented these mandates. 88 Some have even continued to adopt 
and enforce new inconsistent or redundant local strictures.1!9 
Therefore, district unwillingness or reluctance to follow the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure evinces decreasing confidence in the 
national amendment process. Indeed, observers attribute those 
phenomena to belief by local judges, lawyers and parties that the 
federal rule revisers "got it wrong" or that districts can fashion 
superior rules. 90 
A second indicium is the fifty states' growing willingness to 
deviate from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a model. A 
1986 nationwide assessment revealed that many jurisdictions based 
all or most essential features of their state civil rules (such as 
discovery) on federal analogues soon after 1938.91 However, 
jurisdictions with larger populations often did not invoke the national 
rules template.92 Although the attorneys and law professors who 
drafted the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure hoped these 
requirements might serve as a paradigm that jurisdictions would 
emulate, thus fostering uniform intrastate civil practice,93 since the 
87. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83 (amended 1995); FED. R. CIV. P. 83 (amended 
1985); 28 u.s.c. §§ 332 (d)(4), 2071 (1994). 
88. See Tobias, supra note 85, at 556-{)8; see also Heiser, supra note 85, at 
557-64. 
89. See id. 
90. See, e.g., John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State 
Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354, 359 (2003); Robel, supra note 79, at 1484; see also 
Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil 
Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393 (1992). One respected federal district court 
judge has astutely remarked: "(A]s a trial judge myself perhaps I will be 
forgiven for stating the point bluntly--nationally uniform rules protect ... 
against the tyranny of any unduly willful renegades among us trial judges." 
Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with 
Uniformity, 50 U. PITI. L. REV. 853, 860 (1989). 
91. See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State 
Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 
1367, 1427 (1986). 
92. See id 
93. See Subrin, supra note 85, at 2011-19; Tobias, supra note 85, at 53Cr 
39; see also Oakley, supra note 90, at 354-56, 384. 
96. See id. 
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1980s, state reliance on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a 
model has actually declined.96 
In 2003, Professor John Oakley undertook a similar evaluation 
and ascertained that virtually no jurisdictions premised all their civil 
rules on the federal counterparts.97 Professor Oakley also intimated 
that state departures could well expand over time. 98 More 
specifically and quite relevant to this article, Oakley found only one-
third of the jurisdictions (which he determined substantially 
complied with the national paradigm during 1986) had adopted the 
1993 revision in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, even though 
eighty-five percent of the jurisdictions had previously instituted the 
1983 version.99 Oakley also suggested that decreasing respect for the 
national amendment process explained the phenomenon, and he 
voiced "confiden[ ce] that the era of federal procedural hegemony 
ha[d] ended."100 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The above considerations, especially the lessons denominated in 
Part III, prompt the articulation of several recommendations for the 
future. The major purpose of these recommendations is to restore 
and bolster the apparently flagging confidence in national rule 
revision at the federal district court level and in the procedural 
systems of the fifty states by improving the national amendment 
process itself or, at least, by responding to its most detrimental 
aspects. 
97. See Oakley, supra note 90, at 355, 383-84; see also Carl Tobias, The 
Past and Future of the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 400, 404-05 
(2003) (suggesting ways to remedy inconsistency between federal and state 
civil procedure). 
98. See id 
99. A mere ten percent of the fifty jurisdictions subscribed to the 1993 
federal revision of Rule 26 that imposed automatic disclosure. See Oakley, 
supra note 90, at 382-83, 386. 
100. See id at 383; see also Oakley, supra note 81 (discussing the need to 
reform the federal rule revision process). 
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A. The Federal System 
1. The Rule Revisers 
The federal rule revisers must seriously consider whether the 
frequency and number of amendments since the 1983 revision of 
Rule 11 were warranted (i.e., particularly by empirical data 
demonstrating a grave complication that necessitated treatment 
which an amendment would remedy). The prior analysis found that 
the rate and quantity of modifications with insufficient empirical 
justification have been detrimental and perhaps undermined a few 
changes' efficacy. For instance, the majority of the 1983 revisions 
expanded lawyers' duties and judicial control, partly through the 
imposition of sanctions for Rule 11 violations. However, minimal 
empirical data showed there was a troubling difficulty that Rule 11 
would address. 101 Even though virtually no empirical data justified 
the nationwide application of this unconventional technique, the rule 
revisers broadly amended Rule 11 a decade later, when the 1983 
amendment became controversial, as one feature of another 
substantial package that imposed mandatory disclosure.102 The rule 
revisers promulgated a third large set of amendments only seven 
years thereafter, mainly addressing discovery provisions, with little 
empirical data indicating that the discovery regime experienced 
serious problems, or that the proposed modifications would treat any 
difficulties which the system imposed. 103 Therefore, the rule revisers 
101. See supra note 76. 
102. The Advisory Committee did rely on experimentation with automatic 
disclosure by three federal districts, although this testing may have been 
insufficient to support the rather dramatic change instituted. See supra note 78 
and accompanying text. 
103. The Advisory Committee did commission the Federal Judicial Center 
and the RAND Institute for Civil Justice to perform discovery studies, which 
the Committee employed when deciding whether it should propose additional 
change in the discovery strictures. The Committee members relied in part on 
these evaluations' findings to prescribe the 2000 discovery amendments. See 
James S. Kakalik et al., Rand Institute for Civil Justice, Discovery 
Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation 
Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613 (1998); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical 
Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule 
Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525 (1998). The Committee's dependence on 
the studies and the revisions has been somewhat controversial. For example, 
the studies found discovery problematic in few, mainly complex, cases, but the 
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should prescribe amendments less often and institute fewer of them, 
while guaranteeing that valid empirical data underlie the changes. 
For example, the revisers might limit future alterations to situations 
in which experts thoroughly collect, assess, and synthesize empirical 
data that demonstrate a severe complication requiring treatment, 
which a federal rule modification can solve or temper without 
harmful side effects. 
The revisers may want to implement some of this article's 
recommendations by adopting a withdrawn 1991 proposed change in 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83.104 This model represents a 
balanced approach that would facilitate district experimentation with 
promising local measures which depart from the federal rules 
because it authorizes courts to test these procedures when districts 
secure Judicial Conference approval. 105 If the experimentation 
showed that particular mechanisms functioned well, the revisers 
could then suggest national amendments with greater confidence 
about how the devices operated in practice. 
2. The Federal District Courts 
There are several changes which the ninety-four federal district 
courts might institute to enhance the national rule revision process. 
Most importantly, the districts should refrain from prescribing new 
local strictures that conflict with or repeat, and abrogate or modify 
the existing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.106 This would help to 
restore and foster more confidence in national amendments while 
enlarging respect for the federal rules as a national procedure code. 
The action would simplify, and perhaps decrease the cost of and 
amendments apply to substantially more lawsuits. See sources cited supra note 
76. 
104. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 51, at 153. See generally Walker, 
supra note 76 (suggesting that the failure to collect valid information before 
implementing rule amendments is the chief deficiency in federal rules 
development). 
105. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 51, at 153. See generally Levin, 
supra note 76, at 1576 (discussing the 1991 proposal and how mechanisms for 
challenging local rules when they are inconsistent with federal rules have 
rarely been invoked); Tobias, supra note 79, at 1633-34 (arguing that future 
experimentation should follow the 1991 proposal to amend Federal Rule 83). 
106. For sources that impose these duties on the federal districts and on 
Circuit Judicial Councils, the policymaking ·arms of the appeals courts, see 
supra note 87. 
Winter 2004] RULE 11 AND RULE REVISION 595 
reduce delay in, local federal practice. Hence, these changes would 
limit the requirements that judges must interpret and apply and that 
lawyers and parties must find, comprehend, and satisfy. 
Should the national rule revisers adopt the rescinded 1991 
proposed alteration of Federal Rule 83, the trial courts might devise 
and suggest innovative experiments with measures that would 
facilitate national and local practice. 107 If the amendment entities do 
not subscribe to the withdrawn 1991 concept, districts should 
assemble and evaluate relevant material on difficulties with federal 
rules and local techniques as well as their potential solutions and 
should forward this information to the rule revisers for consideration 
in the national amendment process. 
3. Miscellaneous Suggestions 
Fundamental to the initiatives assessed will be continuing, and 
perhaps expanding, dependence on the Federal Judicial Center and 
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
(Administrative Office).1°8 The federal judiciary's research and 
administrative arms can provide valuable expertise and assistance to 
the rule revisers and the district courts. For example, the Federal 
Judicial Center and the Administrative Office now possess or have 
access to considerable informative material. 109 They might collect, 
review and synthesize additional instructive empirical data that could 
support national rule amendment. 110 The entities may also help 
districts conform their local measures to federal analogues or 
structure proposals for experimentation under the withdrawn 1991 
recommended change to Rule 83, should this promising mechanism 
be implemented. 111 
107. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. 
108. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (providing authoriz.ation for 
the Federal Judicial Center and the entity's duties); 28 U.S.C. §§ 601-13 et 
seq. (1994) (authorizing the Administrative Office as the administrative arm of 
the federal courts and prescribing the entity's duties). 
109. Illustrative is material regarding experimentation under the 1990 Civil 
Justice Reform Act and with automatic disclosure. See supra notes 79, 86, 100 
and accompanying text. 
110. Illustrative are the Federal Judicial Center's collection of empirical data 
which supported Rule 11 's 1993 revision and the discovery provisions' 2000 
amendment. See supra notes 25, 31-37, 78, 101 and accompanying text. 
111. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text. 
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B. The States 
Numerous propositions afforded in this article that implicate the 
federal regime apply with equal force or by analogy to the states. 
Most importantly, the fifty jurisdictions must seriously reconsider 
whether they should have deviated from the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure as a model following the 1983 amendment. This 
phenomenon was epitomized by the unwillingness or reluctance to 
promulgate state counterparts embodying the 1993 revision of Rule 
11. 112 The growing disuniformity between federal and state civil 
procedures imposes expense and potentially wastes time in intrastate 
practice because it requires attorneys and parties to learn about, 
understand and comply with disparate federal and state mandates.113 
These ideas mean that the fifty jurisdictions' rule amendment 
entities (which are similar to the federal revisers) should do the 
following: (1) base civil procedures as much as possible on federal 
strictures; (2) eschew additional, and eliminate or modify current, 
state requirements that are inconsistent with federal ones; and (3) at 
least adopt Federal Rule 11 's 1993 amendment, which seemed to 
treat the 1983 version's worst features, namely chilling effects and 
satellite litigation.114 Insofar as trial courts in the fifty jurisdictions 
apply local measures that depart from federal or state civil 
procedures, the judges must similarly refrain from prescription of 
new ones and should abolish or change existing techniques. 
If rule revision entities and courts in the jurisdictions undertake 
efforts to implement the recommendations afforded, they should 
consult state institutions, which resemble the Federal Judicial Center 
and the Administrative Office, when available, as well as the two 
federal entities. The National Center for State Courts might 
correspondingly furnish much assistance as a valuable repository of, 
112. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
113. See, e.g., John P. Frank, Local Rules, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2059 (1989); 
Carl Tobias, A Civil Discovery Dilemma for the Arizona Supreme Court, 34 
Aruz. ST. L.J. 615 (2002). See generally Seymour Moskowitz, Rediscovering 
Discovery: State Procedural Rules and the Level Playing Field, 54 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 595 (2002). 
114. See supra notes 50-51, 54-55, 58-60 and accompanying text But see 
Danielle Kie Hart, Still Chilling After All These Years: Rule 11 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Its Impact on Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs After 
the 1993 Amendments, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
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and clearinghouse for, empirical data on the fifty jurisdictions' civil 
procedure systems. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The 1983 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 was 
the most controversial revision in the half-century history of the 
federal rules. Counsel and litigants overused and abused the revision 
and judges inconsistently effectuated it partly because the 
amendment was grounded on minimal empirical data. The 1983 
modification has undermined confidence in the national rule 
amendment process. If the federal rule revisers and district courts, as 
well as their state analogues, follow the suggestions offered, they 
might restore confidence in, and improve, the process. 
